Introduction

In his 1996 essay Rethinking Democracy, neopragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty outlines four theses of postmodern scepticism. [Rorty 2022:68]

Thesis 1 - There is no intrinsic character of reality, no one way the world is. No description of the world is closer to nature than any other.

Thesis 1 emphasises that we shouldn’t favour one description of the world over another. We can have multiple descriptions of the world without choosing one over the other. Moreover, the world can be described in various ways without a single, definitive explanation. Therefore, we can’t categorically label the UK as a liberal democracy because there’s no intrinsic characteristic of it that makes it the case. It’s just one of many descriptions of the UK’s political system.

Thesis 2 - There is no correspondence to reality to serve as the mark of truth. Rather, we call beliefs true when they seem better tools than any as-yet-imagined alternative beliefs.

Truth isn’t determined by whether it accurately reflects the real world, like whether a brown eye is truly brown. Instead, true beliefs are more useful than alternative ones, such as whether having a brown eye better explains my sense of looking at myself in a mirror than having a blue eye. Similarly, consider a scenario where something in front of me resembles an apple. Postmodern scepticism suggests that the usefulness of stating “there’s a red apple in front of me” compared to “there’s a red banana in front of me” determines the truth of the proposition, rather than whether there is indeed a red apple in front of me.

Thesis 3 - Interpretation goes all the way down: there is no contrast between a fact and an interpretation except degrees of consensus: a "fact" is a widely accepted interpretation.

This thesis denies the existence of facts in their absolute sense. Instead, a fact is merely an interpretation that has gained a certain level of consensus regarding its truthfulness, thereby justifying the label “fact.” Everything is essentially an interpretation, and those interpretations that have achieved a consensus of truthfulness are considered facts. Therefore, the interpretation “Keir Starmer is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom” is an interpretation of the world that has garnered such a strong consensus that we refer to it as a fact.

Thesis 4 - There is no objective fact about human beings which dictates our biological species should also be a moral community. The project of constructing such a community is one interpretation of the significance of the human existence among others.

Thesis 4 denies the existence of a moral fact that establishes humanity as a moral community. This doesn’t negate the desirability of a cosmopolitan moral community encompassing the entire globe. Instead, it asserts that there’s no fact underlying that claim. The significance we attach to human existence relative to other communities ultimately determines whether such a community can be realised.

After explaining postmodern scepticism, we’ll apply it to the natural sciences to address the question of scientific truth. Pragmatism offers a more comprehensive explanation of how science functions epistemologically compared to postmodern scepticism.

We also will contend that there are practical reasons to reject certain postmodern skeptical theses in moral and political philosophy. Moral clarity requires correspondence with reality and a singular interpretation of events. Postmodern scepticism warns against this, but disregarding it has far more morally concerning consequences.

Part One: The Natural Sciences

Newtonian Mechanics vs General Relativity

Pragmatist epistemology posits that the validity of a proposition lies in its usefulness. Newtonian Mechanics, for instance, is not valid because it accurately describes the world. Instead, its predictive capabilities are highly valuable for engineers and physicists in explaining the motion of objects. Newtonian mechanics performs this task exceptionally well. We rely on it to fly planes and construct towering skyscrapers. In fact, its effectiveness is so remarkable that we continue to teach it despite it being wrong.

Newtonian mechanics simply fails to accurately describe the nature of reality. It posits space and time as absolute entities, treating time as a uniform and unchanging force that passes independently of any events or locations within the universe. For instance, if you were located near the event horizon of Sagittarius A*, the supermassive black hole at the centre of the Milky Way, Newtonian mechanics would imply that global time would behave identically for you and for me on planet Earth. In other words, as you approach the Sagittarius A*'s event horizon, you won't experience any time dilation.

In fact, Newtonian Mechanics posits that the entire universe is governed by a single, universal clock. Space and time are absolute entities, ensuring that Newton’s first law of motion holds consistently in Newtonian space and time. Consequently, we have a global inertial frame of reference that defines a global coordinate system in which Newton’s first law of motion is always valid. This shared clock arises because space and time behave uniformly across the universe. Regardless of your location, time will remain the same globally.

Newton's first law: Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed. (Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica)

However, general relativity reveals that this isn’t the case. Space and time are relativistic entities. Only local inertial frames of reference exist. This is because for an inertial frame of reference to be valid, space must be flat. Yet, general relativity asserts that space-time is curved, or there wouldn’t be any gravity. Without a global inertial frame of reference, there’s no universal clock we all share. There are only local clocks that are accurate within the local inertial frame of reference.

Consequently, there’s no universal “now.” It doesn’t make sense to say that you’ll fall into Sagittarius A*’s event horizon at the same time I write this essay. What makes sense is that at the moment I write this essay, which is my “now,” you’ll get close to the event horizon but never pass. At the same time, in your frame of reference, when you enter the black hole, which is your “now,” I’ll be doing something in what I consider my future.

My “now” and your “now” don’t necessarily coincide. In fact, for us Earthlings, it’s a useful fiction that we have a simultaneous “now”—a single moment when Francesco Acerbi scored that equaliser in the greatest Champions League semi-final of all time. However, this isn’t entirely accurate. We’re all affected by Earth’s gravity, so those on top of Mount Vesuvius, watching the final, have a different inertial frame of reference and sense of “now” compared to those in the San Siro. Nevertheless, these differences are so minuscule that we can’t perceive them. It’s practically convenient and effectively true that those on Mount Vesuvius and those in the San Siro share a “now.”

What does all this tell us? The validity of Newtonian Mechanics is determined by its predictive capabilities and practical utility, not by its correspondence to reality. Our common sense of time is a useful fiction that helps coordinate global actions. For instance, it enables us to know when the Internazionale football match against Barcelona commenced, when the New York Stock Exchange will open for trading, what I was doing when someone I knew reached the summit of Mount Everest, or what we were doing when Neil Armstrong made the first lunar landing. Nevertheless, it’s a useful lie that deceives us for practical purposes.

Quantum Mechanics and Anti-Realism

Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, provides little concrete information about reality at the quantum scale. Numerous interpretations of quantum mechanics exist, each offering a distinct perspective on the implications of quantum mechanics for reality. Some interpretations support the multiverse theory, while others view the wavefunction—a description of all possible states within a quantum system—as merely a mathematical entity. Others believe it possesses physical reality, while others deny its existence altogether.

David Mermin encapsulated this elusive revelation by proclaiming, “shut up and calculate!” Quantum physicists precisely predict reality through their equations, without delving into the underlying connections between these equations and the world we perceive. These predictions paved the way for the engineering of semiconductors, which would have been an insurmountable task otherwise. Moreover, quantum mechanics stands as the most extensively and accurately tested scientific theory in history. All this, despite the fact that quantum physicists remain perplexed about the true meaning of these equations in the context of reality.

The issue with all these interpretations is that they lack testability and don’t provide a clear advantage over others. Interpretations like the Copenhagen interpretation collapse the wavefunction under certain conditions. However, how can we determine whether the wavefunction is real or merely a mathematical representation when attempts to measure it lead to its collapse? This is an unsolvable problem. Similarly, how can we prove the existence of other universes, each with every possible permutation of the wavefunction’s contents? This is another unanswerable question.

We also understand that quantum mechanics and general relativity are incompatible. This is the challenge for 21st-century physics. Are any of these interpretations capable of overcoming this incompatibility, providing a way to model reality that makes them compatible? Unfortunately, none of them offer such a solution. The many worlds interpretations predict the existence of multiple universes, which is also supported by other theories like String theory. However, the evidence for String theory is currently lacking.

Pragmatist epistemology aids us in explaining why these interpretations are dead ends in scientific inquiry, which such discussions are best suited for the philosophy of quantum mechanics. We lack a means of establishing a correspondence between reality, and furthermore, they don’t make any different predictions regarding quantum mechanics, so we have no way of determining which interpretation is more accurate.

Does Newtonian and Quantum Mechanics give credence to postmodernist scepticism?

Newtonian Mechanics doesn’t give much credence to postmodern scepticism, but rather pragmatism. It still advocates for an objective and absolute external world with clearly delineated facts. The reason this picture is incorrect is not because general relativity contradicts objectivity, but rather the concept of absolute space. Space-time being relativistic is an objective fact of the world. Objective facts do exist within space-time as well, but these objective facts are relative to a specific frame of reference. Relativistic space-time doesn’t make facts non-objective, as in only true in specific contexts.

Newtonian Mechanics, evidently, supports epistemic pragmatism. The theory is highly useful and yields precise results for our practical needs. In aircraft design, we can assume Newtonian mechanics and fluid dynamics based on classical mechanics as accurate because of their practical utility. That’s pragmatism.

Quantum mechanics, on the surface, supports postmodern scepticism. We can’t describe the physical reality of a quantum system because we don’t know which interpretation is actually true. Our conventions and metaphysical biases influence which interpretation we prefer. Moreover, the nature of the wavefunction suggests that there’s “no intrinsic character of reality.” The wavefunction describes all possible states a quantum system can have, and some interpretations don’t even require a wavefunction. Finally, we know that quantum mechanics and general relativity are incompatible. Neither theory describes reality in its entirety and cannot.

However, this only holds true initially. Quantum mechanics once again supports a pragmatic epistemology. Which interpretation is true is irrelevant because the predictive power of quantum mechanics surpasses all else, enabling us to develop technologies that would have been impossible otherwise. These interpretations, in fact, serve no practical purpose. As we shall see below, the scientific method of discovering scientific knowledge supports the concept of objective facts, even if we can interpret those facts in various ways. This does not support postmodernism, but rather pragmatism and anti-realism.

Five-Sigma and the Scientific Method

Scientists establish confidence in their results through methods like the "five sigma" test. This is the burden of proof that scientists must meet before announcing a result. Data contains random fluctuations that can give the impression that a phenomenon exists when it doesn’t. Removing the impact of these fluctuations is crucial for scientists to reach a firm conclusion about what the data actually tells them.

Let’s consider the example of the discovery of gravitational waves. Scientists calculate the mean of the entire data set, which essentially represents the typical background noise. Physicists then compare the data at the specific instance they believe a gravitational wave was detected with the entire sample. By calculating the distance between the suspected gravitational wave data and the mean, they determine the standard deviation, denoted as 𝝈. A low standard deviation indicates that the suspected gravitational wave was likely just random fluctuations. Conversely, a high standard deviation suggests that random fluctuations are improbable causes of the gravitational wave-like phenomena observed in the data set. In fact, physicists have strong grounds for believing they have detected something worthy of peer review.

A 5-𝝈 test almost certainly confirms the existence of phenomena, as used in confirming the existence of the Higgs boson. In contrast, a 3-𝝈 test allows for some statistical interference but provides evidence supporting the hypothesis in question.

Statistical reasoning, not consensus, determines the effectiveness of a test in uncovering the investigated phenomena. Consensus only emerges after a hypothesis passes the “n-𝝈” test, where n represents the number of standard deviations from the mean. Another consensus exists within the methodology itself, based on the principles of probability theory. This consensus validates the scientific method, not any specific result derived from it. Therefore, facts do exist.

Postmodern skeptics erroneously equate the sociology of scientific knowledge, which encompasses the social process of acquiring knowledge, with epistemology of science, which delves into the study of determining which scientific truths we know. By disregarding epistemology, postmodern skeptics presume that sociological accounts of knowledge acquisition are the sole relevant factors. Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is not a critique of the scientific method’s validity but rather a description of the sociology of scientific knowledge and the associated revolutions. In practice, scientists are not rigid adherents of the scientific method. They possess their own pet theories and biases that reject theories such as Quantum Mechanics. Even Albert Einstein was not immune to this tendency.

"I, at any rate, am convinced that [God] does not throw dice" - Albert Einstein

Einstein vehemently rejected the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics because they contradicted his understanding of physical reality, a stance that some consider his greatest error. He encountered similar resistance when introducing his theory of special and general relativity. The traditional scientific community resisted accepting a relativistic concept of space-time, preferring the absolute space and time described by Isaac Newton. As a society, scientists are often resistant to change. The complexities of quantum mechanics baffled physicists so much that sociological factors played no role in its development. The successful predictions of quantum mechanics, such as the double-slit experiment, validated the theory. It was the epistemic validity of the scientific method that granted the pioneers of quantum mechanics the social power to initiate another scientific revolution, akin to the Kuhnian paradigm.

Postmodern scepticism is merely another form of philosophical scepticism that lacks practical utility and fails to elucidate the workings of science. A naturalistic pragmatist epistemology provides the most comprehensive explanation for the scientific method, which can adopt either realism or anti-realism as its stance. While correspondence with reality is a crucial yet not exclusive criterion for a sound scientific theory, it is not a necessary condition for its success.

Part Two: Moral and Political Philosophy

The scientific method, however, doesn’t provide insights into what constitutes right and wrong, nor does it guide us in organising our political systems. How do we acquire moral knowledge? What is the epistemology of moral philosophy and ethical standards? Similarly, for political norms and determining the most suitable constitutional framework.

A healthy scepticism is always welcome in philosophy. We should never accept the truth of a claim at face value, especially when influential figures are behind them. Successful societies, however, require robust institutions that necessitate sufficient trust for people to somewhat regard them as authorities to be followed. This trust doesn’t necessarily come at the expense of scepticism; in fact, it can be beneficial. Nevertheless, a scepticism that fosters widespread mistrust in institutions can be detrimental to the well-being of a nation, although it may sometimes be necessary for radical transformation.

What about meta-narratives, grand narratives about how societies and civilizations function? We Westerners often believe we live in a free world. However, is that accurate? Is questioning that narrative harmful or impractical? No, it’s not. Existentially questioning the foundations of our civilisation is the responsibility of political philosophy, not for its own sake, but for progress. Are we truly what we claim to be? Similarly, the same applies to morality. Are we as morally and ethically upright as we believe ourselves to be?

Case Study 1 - Genocide

The issue of genocide significantly contributes to this understanding. Many individuals on the left are critically examining the virtues of Western civilisation due to the fact that several Western countries are providing support to Israel in its actions against Palestinians. This raises the question of whether the West possesses any moral superiority over other genocidal regimes such as Russia and China. Furthermore, it prompts us to assess whether the Western liberal world order is righteous and whether such a “rule-based order” truly exists.

When our civilizations encounter a roadblock, reinterpreting our past can lead to innovative solutions that might otherwise remain elusive. Constructive criticism, particularly when grounded in postmodern thought, can be a valuable tool in this endeavour. However, it’s important to distinguish between a pure scepticism of meta-narratives and a pragmatic assessment of their impact on our civilisation. In essence, we employ postmodern thought for pragmatic purposes to evaluate the extent to which our received wisdom is part of a narrative that perpetuates problematic power structures hindering civilisational progress.

Ironically, postmodern scepticism, as defined by the four theses, doesn’t provide us with any useful insights. Consider the example of the Palestinian genocide. When we witness the complete devastation of Gaza through images, don’t we desire a direct correspondence between the visual representation and the interpretation of it as one piece of evidence supporting genocide? Of course, pragmatism here demands a rejection of postmodern scepticism because we genuinely require concrete facts.

Without objective facts, we face the danger that regimes will exploit our scepticism, paralysing us from ascertaining what’s true and ensuring just actions are taken. Even when Russia claims to be de-Nazifying Ukraine, images of troops from the fascist and neo-Nazi Wagner Group, and others, provide ample reason to doubt the sincerity of their claims. Similarly, when examining images of Gaza, the level of destruction is not necessary to destroy Hamas.

There’s a distinction between empirical and moral facts. Empirical facts are crucial because they clarify how the world was configured so we can make unequivocal moral judgments when necessary, such as in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity. However, it doesn’t imply that we’re treating the unequivocal condemnation of genocide as a moral fact in itself. Instead, we assume that by acquiring moral norms, we would eventually reach an unequivocal rejection of genocide. This is also why we chose such an extreme example in this essay - we wanted a crime so abhorrent that it’s challenging to argue morally for it objectively and without any specific context. Nevertheless, within a particular context, people can morally justify genocide for various purposes, such as survival, national greatness, or eliminating problematic social classes.

Case Study 2 - Climate Change Denial

We can link our earlier enquiry into scientific truth with the morality of climate change. A common strategy that certain industrialists, with a vested interest in emitting fossil fuels, enact is denying the reality of climate change. The science on climate change is clear. Human activity is causing it and that we're currently on track to destroy Earth's biodiverse ecosystems, without which human civilisation as we know is unsustainable.

Again, we can treat anthropogenic climate change as an established fact because of how convincing the scientific evidence is. Even by the standards of postmodern scepticism, we can treat it as a fact as well. Considering the potential consequences to human civilisation and the ecosystem as a whole, it is insidious that people manipulate what's true for their own ends. The example shares the same pattern as our case study on genocide, but with potentially far worse destructive consequences than any genocide in human history.

Essentially, without facts, we remain susceptible to deception, particularly the most insidious form - genocide denial. Facts and a correspondence between reality and our beliefs are crucial for making moral and political judgments, even when we lack certainty about their accuracy. Pragmatist epistemology provides compelling reasons for rejecting both thesis 1 and 2. Of course, there are instances where we have grounds to believe they hold, but not always. Consequently, postmodern scepticism fails on its own merits.

Conclusion

We’ve demonstrated that postmodern scepticism holds no relevance in the sciences, even when quantum mechanics appears to offer initial support. A naturalistic pragmatist epistemology best encapsulates the scientific method, where predictive capabilities are more reliable indicators of truth than mere correspondence with reality. Without facts that correspond with reality, we also remain susceptible to genocide denial or other insidious deceptions.

While physicists can pragmatically switch between Newtonian and quantum models based on the context, in social and political contexts, this flexibility is often exploited by powerful entities to evade accountability. Unlike the laboratory, there’s no neutral ground where the oppressed can accept their oppression as merely a different perspective. Consequently, Rorty’s pragmatism, while sophisticated in scientific contexts, could become a blunt instrument of cynicism.

Even though postmodernism can make us realise that the truths we supposedly upheld are influenced by powerful agents and forces in our society, ultimately, having facts at our disposal are more effective in providing robust moral and political criticism. A core question of political philosophy:

How might we develop a polity that maintains both the humility and utility of pragmatism, with the resolute factual commitments necessary to sustain justice?”

In the spirit of epistemic pragmatism, French physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace encapsulates postmodern scepticism at its finest:

"Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là."

Bibliography

Rorty, R. Ed: Malecki, W.P. and Voparil, C. 2022 What can we hope for? - Essays on Politics. Oxford: Princeton University Press

The link has been copied!